ABSTRACT
Global health requires evidence-based approaches to improve health and decrease inequalities. In a roundtable discussion between health practitioners, funders, academics and policy-makers, we recognised key areas for improvement to deliver better-informed, sustainable and equitable global health practices. These focus on considering information-sharing mechanisms and developing evidence-based frameworks that take an adaptive function-based approach, grounded in the ability to perform and respond to prioritised needs. Increasing social engagement as well as sector and participant diversity in whole-of-society decision-making, and collaborating with and optimising on hyperlocal and global regional entities, will improve prioritisation of global health capabilities. Since the skills required to navigate drivers of pandemics, and the challenges in prioritising, capacity building and response do not sit squarely in the health sector, it is essential to integrate expertise from a broad range of fields to maximise on available knowledge during decision-making and system development. Here, we review the current assessment tools and provide seven discussion points for how improvements to implementation of evidence-based prioritisation can improve global health.
Subject(s)
Evidence-Based Practice , Global Health , HumansABSTRACT
The World Health Organization (WHO) notifies the global community about disease outbreaks through the Disease Outbreak News (DON). These online reports tell important stories about both outbreaks themselves and the high-level decision making that governs information sharing during public health emergencies. However, they have been used only minimally in global health scholarship to date. Here, we collate all 2,789 of these reports from their first use through the start of the Covid-19 pandemic (January 1996 to December 2019), and develop an annotated database of the subjective and often inconsistent information they contain. We find that these reports are dominated by a mix of persistent worldwide threats (particularly influenza and cholera) and persistent epidemics (like Ebola virus disease in Africa or MERS-CoV in the Middle East), but also document important periods in history like the anthrax bioterrorist attacks at the turn of the century, the spread of chikungunya and Zika virus to the Americas, or even recent lapses in progress towards polio elimination. We present three simple vignettes that show how researchers can use these data to answer both qualitative and quantitative questions about global outbreak dynamics and public health response. However, we also find that the retrospective value of these reports is visibly limited by inconsistent reporting (e.g., of disease names, case totals, mortality, and actions taken to curtail spread). We conclude that sharing a transparent rubric for which outbreaks are considered reportable, and adopting more standardized formats for sharing epidemiological metadata, might help make the DON more useful to researchers and policymakers.
ABSTRACT
Epidemic risk assessment and response relies on rapid information sharing. Using examples from the past decade, we discuss the limitations of the present system for outbreak notifications, which suffers from ambiguous obligations, fragile incentives, and an overly narrow focus on human outbreaks. We examine existing international legal frameworks, and provide clarity on what a successful One Health approach to proposed international law reforms-including a pandemic treaty and amendments to the International Health Regulations-would require. In particular, we focus on how a treaty would provide opportunities to simultaneously expand reporting obligations, accelerate the sharing of scientific discoveries, and strengthen existing legal frameworks, all while addressing the most complex issues that global health governance currently faces.
Subject(s)
International Law , One Health , Disease Outbreaks , Global Health , Humans , International CooperationABSTRACT
An evidence-based treaty must balance prevention, preparedness, response, and repair.
Subject(s)
International Cooperation , Pandemics , Zoonoses , Animals , Humans , Pandemics/prevention & control , Risk , Zoonoses/epidemiology , Zoonoses/prevention & controlABSTRACT
In the light of the urgency raised by the COVID-19 pandemic, global investment in wildlife virology is likely to increase, and new surveillance programmes will identify hundreds of novel viruses that might someday pose a threat to humans. To support the extensive task of laboratory characterization, scientists may increasingly rely on data-driven rubrics or machine learning models that learn from known zoonoses to identify which animal pathogens could someday pose a threat to global health. We synthesize the findings of an interdisciplinary workshop on zoonotic risk technologies to answer the following questions. What are the prerequisites, in terms of open data, equity and interdisciplinary collaboration, to the development and application of those tools? What effect could the technology have on global health? Who would control that technology, who would have access to it and who would benefit from it? Would it improve pandemic prevention? Could it create new challenges? This article is part of the theme issue 'Infectious disease macroecology: parasite diversity and dynamics across the globe'.
Subject(s)
Disease Reservoirs/virology , Global Health , Pandemics/prevention & control , Zoonoses/prevention & control , Zoonoses/virology , Animals , Animals, Wild , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19/veterinary , Ecology , Humans , Laboratories , Machine Learning , Risk Factors , SARS-CoV-2 , Viruses , Zoonoses/epidemiologySubject(s)
COVID-19/epidemiology , Global Burden of Disease , Health Equity/standards , Healthcare Disparities , COVID-19/diagnosis , COVID-19/economics , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19 Testing/economics , COVID-19 Testing/standards , COVID-19 Vaccines/administration & dosage , Health Equity/economics , Health Equity/organization & administration , Humans , Pandemics/economics , Pandemics/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2/isolation & purification , Vaccination/economics , Vaccination/standardsSubject(s)
COVID-19/prevention & control , Communicable Disease Control/methods , Pandemics/prevention & control , COVID-19/epidemiology , Climate Change , Communicable Disease Control/trends , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Forecasting , Global Health , Health Policy , Humans , Risk Factors , SARS-CoV-2 , TravelABSTRACT
Recent reports suggest that some SARS-CoV-2 genetic variants, such as B.1.1.7, might be more transmissible and are quickly spreading around the world. As the emergence of more transmissible variants could exacerbate the pandemic, we provide public health guidance for increased surveillance and measures to reduce community transmission.
Subject(s)
COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19/transmission , Communicable Disease Control , SARS-CoV-2/genetics , Age Factors , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/virology , Epidemiological Monitoring , Global Health , Humans , Mandatory Programs , Pandemics , SARS-CoV-2/physiology , Travel/legislation & jurisprudence , United Kingdom/epidemiology , Vulnerable PopulationsABSTRACT
The US has experienced a series of epidemics during the past five decades. None has tested the nation's resilience like the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which has laid bare critical weaknesses in US pandemic preparedness and domestic leadership and the nation's decline in global standing in public health. Pandemic response has been politicized, proven public health measures undermined, and public confidence in a science-based public health system reduced. This has been compounded by the large number of citizens without ready access to health care, who are overrepresented among infected, hospitalized, and fatal cases. Here, as part of the National Academy of Medicine's Vital Directions for Health and Health Care: Priorities for 2021 initiative, we review the US approach to pandemic preparedness and its impact on the response to COVID-19. We identify six steps that should be taken to strengthen US pandemic resilience, strengthen and modernize the US health care system, regain public confidence in government leadership in public health, and restore US engagement and leadership in global partnerships to address future pandemic threats domestically and around the world.